End-to-End Attach Call Flow in LTE 4G
The full attach, step by step from POWER-ON: cell search (PSS/SSS/MIB/SIB) → RACH → RRC → NAS auth → security → attach → default bearer.
This document follows a single LTE UE from the instant you press the power button all the way to the first user-data packet on the default EPS bearer. The Attach procedure is where the radio side (cell search, random access, RRC) and the core side (MME, S-GW/P-GW, HSS) meet: one successful attach authenticates the subscriber, updates their location, creates an IP session, and switches on a Data Radio Bearer. The journey moves through four phases: physical-layer cell search where the UE synchronises to PSS/SSS, decodes the MIB on PBCH and reads SIB1/SIB2 to camp on a suitable cell (A); the contention-based four-message random access that establishes uplink and carries the first NAS message to the MME (B); primary authentication with the HSS over S6a and NAS security establishment (C); and default-bearer session creation across S-GW/P-GW followed by Initial Context Setup, RRC reconfiguration and Attach Accept so data can flow (D). Each step lists the exact 3GPP message, the interface it crosses, the key Information Elements with realistic example values, and a representative packet capture (Wireshark-style dissection) as it would appear in a UE/eNB/core trace. Everything is grounded in TS 23.401 (EPS procedures) and TS 36.300 (E-UTRAN overall architecture).
Introduction
The LTE Attach is the one procedure that takes a device from "powered off" to "online with an IP address and a working data pipe". It is where the radio side (cell search, random access, RRC) and the core side (MME, S-GW/P-GW, HSS) meet: a single successful attach authenticates the subscriber, registers their location, creates an IP session, and switches on a Data Radio Bearer for user traffic. It happens at power-on, after coming back from a long detach, and after certain failures — and every "device cannot get service" ticket eventually gets traced through it.
Attach is best understood as four phases (used throughout this page): physical-layer cell search where the UE synchronises to PSS/SSS, decodes the MIB on PBCH and reads SIB1/SIB2 to camp (A); contention-based four-message random access that establishes uplink and carries the first NAS message to the MME (B); primary authentication with the HSS over S6a and NAS security establishment (C); and default-bearer session creation across S-GW/P-GW followed by Initial Context Setup, RRC reconfiguration and Attach Accept so data can flow (D). Everything is grounded in TS 23.401 (EPS procedures) and TS 36.300 (E-UTRAN overall architecture).
Because attach is a long chain of distinct messages across many interfaces, a failure almost always lives in one specific step. Walking the messages in order — and knowing which node owns each one — turns a vague "attach failure" into a precise, testable hypothesis. That is why each step below lists the exact 3GPP message, the interface it crosses, the key Information Elements with realistic example values, a representative packet capture, and per-step debugging notes.
On this page
Why Attach is needed
In plain words: attach is like checking in at an airport before you can fly. You prove who you are (authentication against the HSS), the desk records where you are (location update / tracking area), security screening is switched on (NAS and AS security), and only then are you issued a boarding pass and a gate — the IP address and the default bearer — that let you actually board and travel (send data). Skip any of these and you never get on the plane.
Concretely, four things must happen before a single user packet can flow. The subscriber must be authenticated so the network knows the USIM is genuine and the UE knows the network is genuine (mutual EPS-AKA). The UE's location must be registered with the HSS so the network can page it later. Security must be established so NAS and AS signalling are ciphered and integrity-protected. And an IP session must be created — a default EPS bearer with an IP address and a QoS profile — because EPS is always-on by design and there is no data path until that bearer exists. Attach performs all four in one procedure.
The EMM procedure that registers a UE with the EPC, authenticates it, activates NAS/AS security, and (via a piggybacked ESM PDN Connectivity Request) creates the always-on default EPS bearer.
A UE that has only found and camped on a cell still cannot send data. Attach is what turns a camped, idle UE into an authenticated, registered, IP-capable one.
RRC connection → NAS Attach Request relayed to the MME → EPS-AKA with the HSS → NAS security → Create Session across S-GW/P-GW → Initial Context Setup + Attach Accept → default bearer active.
Call flow
The message-sequence chart below condenses the whole Attach into a single picture: the UE sets up RRC, the eNB relays the first NAS message to the MME, the MME authenticates the subscriber against the HSS and builds the default bearer across the S-GW/P-GW, and the radio bearer is switched on so data can flow.
RRCConnectionRequest— the UE requests an RRC connection over the air.RRCConnectionSetup— the eNB grants SRB1 and the RRC connection.RRCConnectionSetupCompletecarrying the NASAttach RequestandPDN Connectivity Request.- The eNB relays the NAS PDU to the MME in an
Initial UE Message(S1AP). - The MME fetches authentication vectors from the HSS (
Authentication Information Request/Answer) and runs EPS-AKA with the UE. - NAS
Security Mode Command/Completeactivates NAS ciphering and integrity. - The MME registers the UE's location with the HSS via
Update Location Request/Answer. - The MME builds the default bearer across the S-GW/P-GW with
Create Session Request/Response. Initial Context Setup Requesthands the eNB theAttach Acceptand the activation of the default EPS bearer.- The eNB delivers it to the UE in
RRCConnectionReconfiguration(embedding theAttach Accept). - The UE confirms with
RRCConnectionReconfigurationComplete. - The eNB returns
Initial Context Setup Response(with its downlink S1-U TEID) to the MME. - The UE sends
Attach Completeup as an UL Information Transfer. - The MME stitches the downlink path with
Modify Bearer Request/Responseand user data flows.
Call flow at a glance
| Step | Message | Direction | Interface | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Power-On & PLMN/Band Scan | UE internal | - | Boot USIM, read IMSI/HPLMN, scan EARFCNs, measure RSSI to shortlist carriers |
| 2 | PSS/SSS Synchronisation | eNB → UE | LTE-Uu | Correlate PSS then SSS, derive PCI, acquire slot/frame timing |
| 3 | PBCH / MIB Decode | eNB → UE | LTE-Uu | Decode MIB: SFN, DL bandwidth, PHICH config |
| 4 | SIB1 / SIB2 Acquisition | eNB → UE | LTE-Uu | PLMN/TAC/cellId, cell selection info, RACH-ConfigCommon; camp |
| 5 | PRACH Preamble (Msg1) | UE → eNB | LTE-Uu | Select preamble 0–63, compute RA-RNTI, transmit with power ramping |
| 6 | Random Access Response (Msg2) | eNB → UE | LTE-Uu | MAC RAR: Timing Advance, UL grant, Temporary C-RNTI |
| 7 | RRCConnectionRequest (Msg3) | UE → eNB | LTE-Uu | CCCH: ue-Identity (S-TMSI/random), establishmentCause |
| 8 | RRCConnectionSetup (Msg4) | eNB → UE | LTE-Uu | Contention resolution + SRB1 radioResourceConfigDedicated |
| 9 | RRCConnectionSetupComplete + Attach Request | UE → eNB | LTE-Uu | SRB1: selectedPLMN + NAS Attach Request & PDN Connectivity Request |
| 10 | S1AP Initial UE Message | eNB → MME | S1-MME | Carry NAS Attach Request, eNB UE S1AP ID, TAI, E-CGI |
| 11 | Authentication (S6a + NAS EPS-AKA) | MME ↔ HSS / UE | S6a / S1-MME | Fetch EPS AV, challenge UE, verify RES against XRES |
| 12 | NAS Security Mode Command/Complete | MME ↔ UE | S1-MME | Select EEA/EIA, activate NAS ciphering & integrity |
| 13 | Create Session Request/Response | MME → S-GW → P-GW | S11 / S5-S8 | PDN connectivity, UE IP, default-bearer QoS and TEIDs |
| 14 | S1AP Initial Context Setup Request | MME → eNB | S1-MME | KeNB, security caps, E-RAB list, UE-AMBR + Attach Accept |
| 15 | RRCConnectionReconfiguration | eNB → UE | LTE-Uu | SRB2 + default DRB, AS security, embedded Attach Accept |
| 16 | RRCReconfigurationComplete + ICS Response | UE → eNB → MME | LTE-Uu / S1-MME | Bearer active; eNB returns downlink S1-U TEID |
| 17 | Attach Complete + Modify Bearer | UE → MME → S-GW | S1-MME / S11 | Activate Default EPS Bearer Accept; stitch DL path |
| 18 | User Data on Default Bearer | UE ↔ P-GW | LTE-Uu / S1-U | GTP-U G-PDU carries IP traffic end to end |
Phase A — Power-On & Cell Search (Steps 1–4)
When you power on, the UE has no timing, no frequency lock, and no idea which cell to use. This phase covers the entirely physical-layer-driven process of finding a synchronisation signal, decoding the minimum system information on PBCH, reading SIB1/SIB2, and finally deciding the cell is suitable to camp on. Nothing is transmitted by the UE here — it is receive-and-measure until camping completes and the NAS layer triggers Attach.
On power-up the modem loads its supported-band table and reads the USIM to obtain the permanent identity (IMSI) and the Home PLMN. If a previously used carrier is stored, the UE tunes there first for fast camping; otherwise it performs an initial cell-selection full scan across each supported band's EARFCN raster. For every candidate carrier it measures wideband RSSI to rank the strongest cells before attempting PSS/SSS correlation.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| USIM IMSI | 310410123456789 | Permanent subscriber identity read from USIM at boot |
| Home PLMN (HPLMN) | MCC=310 MNC=410 | Determines highest-priority PLMN for selection |
| Supported bands | B2, B4, B7, B66 | Constrains which frequencies are scanned |
| Cell selection type | stored-information (fallback: initial) | Stored list tried first for fast re-camp |
| EARFCN (DL) | 2850 (Band 7, 2680 MHz) | Candidate downlink carrier frequency |
| Wideband RSSI | -71 dBm | Ranks carriers before per-cell PSS correlation |
| Channel bandwidth | 20 MHz (100 PRB) | Carrier bandwidth hypothesis for measurement |
LTE PHY Layer-1 trace (UE modem, not a radio frame)
Event: power-on / USIM read
USIM: IMSI=310410123456789 HPLMN=310/410 EPS supported
Cell-selection: mode=stored-information (3 stored freqs)
Band scan: B7 EARFCN 2850 → f=2680.0 MHz
Wideband RSSI: -71.4 dBm (candidate, shortlisted)The UE correlates the received signal against the three Primary Synchronization Signals (Zadoff-Chu sequences) to acquire OFDM symbol timing and the physical-layer identity within the group, N_ID(2) ∈ {0,1,2}. It then decodes the Secondary Synchronization Signal to obtain the identity group N_ID(1) ∈ {0..167} and forms the Physical Cell ID as PCI = 3×N_ID(1) + N_ID(2). SSS position also tells the UE whether it is FDD or TDD and yields 5 ms half-frame timing, and the UE measures RSRP on the reference signals to gauge cell quality.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| PSS sequence | N_ID(2) = 0 | Symbol timing + identity-in-group from 1 of 3 ZC roots |
| SSS sequence | N_ID(1) = 56 | Cell-identity group, 1 of 168 sequences |
| PCI | 3×56+0 = 168 | Physical Cell ID = 3×N_ID(1)+N_ID(2) |
| Duplex mode | FDD | Inferred from PSS/SSS symbol placement |
| Half-frame timing | subframe 0 boundary | Locates frame start within the 10 ms frame |
| RSRP | -88 dBm | Cell quality, used later for selection and RACH |
| RSRQ | -10.5 dB | Reference-signal received quality |
LTE PHY Layer-1 trace (PSS/SSS acquisition, not a decoded packet)
PSS: correlation peak, N_ID(2)=0, symbol offset 137
Coarse timing locked, CFO +1.1 kHz corrected
SSS: N_ID(1)=56 duplex=FDD half-frame=0
PCI = 3*56 + 0 = 168
CP: normal frame boundary at subframe 0
Measurement: RSRP -88.1 dBm RSRQ -10.5 dB SINR 9.8 dBWith timing and PCI in hand the UE decodes the Physical Broadcast Channel, which carries the Master Information Block in the centre 72 subcarriers of subframe 0. The MIB is deliberately small: it provides the downlink channel bandwidth (in resource blocks), the PHICH configuration (duration and Ng resource), and the most-significant bits of the System Frame Number. The four MIB copies within a 40 ms window let the UE resolve the full SFN and confirm decode by blind detection of the scrambling. The MIB is the minimum needed before the UE can find SIB1.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| dl-Bandwidth | n100 (20 MHz) | Downlink bandwidth in resource blocks |
| phich-Duration | normal | Number of OFDM symbols for PHICH |
| phich-Resource | oneSixth (1/6) | Ng scaling of PHICH group count |
| systemFrameNumber (8 MSB) | 0x69 (SFN 420, MSBs in MIB) | Frame timing; 2 LSB from PBCH scrambling |
| schedulingInfoSIB1-BR | not present (non-BL UE) | SIB1 bandwidth-reduced scheduling (CAT-M) |
| spare | 0 | Reserved bits in MIB |
LTE Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol
BCCH-BCH-Message
message: mib
mib
dl-Bandwidth: n100 (5)
phich-Config
phich-Duration: normal (0)
phich-Resource: oneSixth (0)
systemFrameNumber: 01101001 [8 MSB, SFN 420]
schedulingInfoSIB1-BR-r13: 0 [not present]
spare: 0000000000 [10 bits]The UE monitors PDCCH for a DCI whose CRC is scrambled by the SI-RNTI (0xFFFF), which schedules SystemInformationBlockType1 on the PDSCH. SIB1 advertises the cellAccessRelatedInfo (PLMN list, trackingAreaCode, cellIdentity), cell-barring status, the cell-selection q-RxLevMin, and the scheduling of the remaining SIBs. SIB2 follows in its SI window and delivers the shared radio resource configuration — crucially the RACH-ConfigCommon the UE needs to attempt random access. After checking the S-criteria and confirming the PLMN is allowed, the UE camps and the NAS layer triggers Attach.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| DCI (PDCCH) | CRC scrambled by SI-RNTI=0xFFFF | Schedules the SIB1 PDSCH |
| plmn-IdentityList | MCC=310 MNC=410 | Advertised serving PLMN(s) |
| trackingAreaCode (TAC) | 0x1A2B (6699) | Tracking Area for the attach/TAU |
| cellIdentity (ECI) | 0x00A1B20 (28-bit) | E-UTRAN cell identity, part of E-CGI |
| q-RxLevMin | -124 dBm | Minimum received level for S-criteria |
| prach-ConfigIndex (SIB2) | 3 (format 0) | Defines PRACH occasions/format for Msg1 |
| rootSequenceIndex (SIB2) | 22 | Zadoff-Chu root for preamble generation |
| ra-ResponseWindowSize | sf10 | Window in which UE monitors for the RAR |
LTE Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol
BCCH-DL-SCH-Message
message: c1 (0)
c1: systemInformationBlockType1 (0)
systemInformationBlockType1
cellAccessRelatedInfo
plmn-IdentityList: 1 item
plmn-Identity: MCC=310 MNC=410
cellReservedForOperatorUse: notReserved (1)
trackingAreaCode: 0x1a2b
cellIdentity: 00a1b20 [28 bits]
cellBarred: notBarred (1)
intraFreqReselection: allowed (0)
cellSelectionInfo
q-RxLevMin: -62 [-124 dBm]
freqBandIndicator: 7
schedulingInfoList: SIB2 (si-Periodicity rf16)
si-WindowLength: ms20 (4)What schedules what in Phase A: the MIB rides PBCH (no DCI — blind-decoded in the centre 72 subcarriers of subframe 0). SIB1 rides PDSCH scheduled by a DCI format 1A/1C whose CRC is scrambled with the SI-RNTI (0xFFFF) in the common search space; SIB2 arrives the same way inside its SI window. Nothing here is UE-specific yet — the UE is receive-only until Msg1.
✅ Debugging steps
- Step 1–2: confirm the UE scans the right band/EARFCN and gets a PSS/SSS lock — check the derived
PCI = 3×N_ID(1)+N_ID(2)and that RSRP/RSRQ clear the reselection thresholds. - Step 3: verify the MIB decodes — a plausible
dl-Bandwidth,phich-Config, and a resolvablesystemFrameNumber; a failed MIB means the UE never finds SIB1. - Step 4: check the UE finds the
SI-RNTI-scrambled DCI and decodes SIB1/SIB2; confirm the advertised PLMN is allowed and the S-criteria (q-RxLevMin) are met so the cell is "suitable", not just "acceptable". - Confirm SIB2 carried the
RACH-ConfigCommonthe UE needs before it can attempt Msg1.
⚠ Common causes of failure
- Wrong band/EARFCN scanned, or RF too weak for a PSS/SSS correlation peak — no cell found.
- MIB CRC failure (poor SINR on PBCH) so SIB1 is never located.
- Cell barred (
cellBarred), PLMN not in the allowed list, orq-RxLevMinnot met — the UE will not camp for service. - SIB2 not acquired within its SI window, so the UE has no PRACH configuration to start RACH.
Phase B — Random Access & RRC Connection (Steps 5–9)
To move from camped/idle to connected the UE performs contention-based four-step random access. Msg1 is a PRACH preamble, Msg2 is the MAC Random Access Response granting timing advance and an uplink allocation, Msg3 is the first scheduled uplink transmission carrying RRCConnectionRequest, and Msg4 resolves contention while delivering RRCConnectionSetup and SRB1. The UE then completes the setup and piggybacks its first NAS message — the Attach Request — inside RRCConnectionSetupComplete.
The UE selects a random contention-based preamble from the 64 available Zadoff-Chu sequences and transmits it on a PRACH occasion derived from the SIB2 prach-ConfigIndex. It computes the RA-RNTI from the time/frequency of the chosen PRACH resource so it can later find its response. Transmit power follows open-loop rules (preambleInitialReceivedTargetPower plus estimated pathloss) and ramps up by powerRampingStep on each retry if no RAR arrives. This is contention-based access because the UE has no dedicated preamble.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| preamble-Index (RAPID) | 27 (0–63) | Randomly chosen contention preamble identity |
| ra-RNTI | 0x0002 | Derived from PRACH time/freq to address the RAR |
| prach-ConfigIndex | 3 (format 0) | From SIB2, selects PRACH format and occasions |
| prach-FreqOffset | 2 | First PRB of the PRACH region in the UL band |
| preambleInitialReceivedTargetPower | -104 dBm | Open-loop power target at the eNB |
| powerRampingStep | 2 dB | Increment added on each preamble retransmission |
| PRACH Tx power | +6 dBm | target + estimated pathloss, attempt 1 |
LTE PHY Layer-1 trace (PRACH preamble Tx, no decodable payload)
RA trigger: initial access (RACH config from SIB2)
Serving cell: PCI 168 (RSRP -88 dBm)
preamble-Index (RAPID): 27 [group A]
ra-RNTI: 0x0002 (subframe 1, PRACH freq resource 0)
PRACH format 0, prach-ConfigIndex 3, freqOffset 2
Tx power: +6 dBm (target -104 dBm + pathloss ~110 dB, attempt 1)The eNB detects the preamble and, within the ra-ResponseWindow, transmits a MAC PDU addressed by the RA-RNTI on PDSCH. The RAR echoes the detected RAPID, carries an 11-bit Timing Advance command to align uplink timing, an uplink grant for Msg3, and a Temporary C-RNTI. The UE matches the RAPID to its chosen preamble, applies the timing advance to achieve uplink synchronisation, and prepares Msg3 on the granted resources.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| ra-RNTI (PDCCH) | 0x0002 | Addresses the RAR to this RACH occasion |
| RAPID (MAC subheader) | 27 | Echoes the UE's preamble index to confirm match |
| Timing Advance Command | 31 | 11-bit TA to align UE uplink to eNB timing |
| UL Grant | 0x1A2F4 | 20-bit grant: MCS/RB assignment for Msg3 |
| Temporary C-RNTI | 0x3D01 | Temporary identity for contention resolution |
| Msg3 size | 56 bits | Granted transport-block size for RRC Msg3 |
| backoffIndicator | absent (BI=0) | No backoff imposed on failure |
MAC-LTE
Context
Direction: Downlink
RNTI Type: RA-RNTI
RA-RNTI: 0x0002 (7)
MAC subheader
E: 0 T: 1 (RAPID present)
RAPID: 27 (matches transmitted preamble)
MAC RAR
Timing Advance Command: 31
UL Grant: 0x1A2F4 (MCS 4, 3 PRB, Msg3 56 bits)
Temporary C-RNTI: 0x3D01
Backoff Indicator: not presentUsing the Msg2 uplink grant, the UE sends RRCConnectionRequest on CCCH/SRB0, scrambled with the Temporary C-RNTI. It carries a 40-bit ue-Identity — the S-TMSI if the UE has one from a prior EPC attach, otherwise a random value — plus an establishmentCause that tells the network why the connection is needed (here mo-Signalling for the attach). Because multiple UEs may have used the same preamble, this message begins contention resolution.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Message | RRCConnectionRequest (CCCH/SRB0) | First UE-originated RRC message |
| ue-Identity choice | s-TMSI | Temporary identity from prior attach (else random) |
| m-TMSI | 0x0C1A55E3 | Contention-resolution / MME routing identity |
| establishmentCause | mo-Signalling | Reason: mobile-originated signalling (attach) |
| Temporary C-RNTI (scrambling) | 0x3D01 | Associates the PUSCH transmission to the RAR |
| Logical channel | CCCH | Common control channel before SRB1 |
| spare | 0 | Reserved bit in RRCConnectionRequest |
LTE Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol
UL-CCCH-Message
message: c1 (0)
c1: rrcConnectionRequest (1)
rrcConnectionRequest
criticalExtensions: rrcConnectionRequest-r8 (0)
rrcConnectionRequest-r8
ue-Identity: s-TMSI (0)
s-TMSI
mmec: 0x01
m-TMSI: 0x0c1a55e3
establishmentCause: mo-Signalling (2)
spare: 0 [bit length 1]The eNB responds with RRCConnectionSetup on DL-CCCH, echoing the CCCH bits for contention resolution and promoting the Temporary C-RNTI to a permanent C-RNTI. The message carries radioResourceConfigDedicated that establishes SRB1 with its RLC (acknowledged mode), logical channel and MAC main configuration, plus physicalConfigDedicated for the UE. Once the UE applies it and confirms contention resolution, the RRC connection moves to RRC_CONNECTED and signalling continues on SRB1.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Message | RRCConnectionSetup (DL-CCCH → SRB1) | Network grants the RRC connection |
| srb-ToAddModList / srb-Identity | 1 | Establishes SRB1 for RRC signalling |
| rlc-Config (SRB1) | am (acknowledged mode) | Reliable retransmission for signalling |
| logicalChannelConfig | priority=1 | High-priority logical channel for SRB1 |
| mac-MainConfig | ul-SCH default (BSR/PHR timers) | MAC parameters for the connection |
| C-RNTI | 0x3D01 (T-C-RNTI promoted) | Permanent cell radio identity |
| rrc-TransactionIdentifier | 0 | Ties setup to the complete message |
LTE Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol
DL-CCCH-Message
message: c1 (0)
c1: rrcConnectionSetup (0)
rrcConnectionSetup
rrc-TransactionIdentifier: 0
criticalExtensions: c1 (0)
c1: rrcConnectionSetup-r8 (0)
radioResourceConfigDedicated
srb-ToAddModList: 1 item
srb-Identity: 1
rlc-Config: explicitValue (am)
logicalChannelConfig: priority 1
mac-MainConfig: explicitValue
physicalConfigDedicated: pucch/pdsch cfgThe UE answers Msg4 with RRCConnectionSetupComplete on SRB1, and inside it piggybacks the very first NAS message: the Attach Request together with a PDN Connectivity Request. Attaching to EPS is always-on by design — the network creates a default EPS bearer as part of attach, so bundling the PDN Connectivity Request lets the MME start building the IP session immediately and saves a round-trip. The Attach Request declares the attach type, the UE identity (GUTI if known, otherwise the network asks for IMSI), the UE network capabilities (supported EEA/EIA algorithms) and DRX parameters. On a first-ever attach there is no security context yet, so this message is neither ciphered nor integrity protected.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Message | RRCConnectionSetupComplete (SRB1/DCCH) | Confirms RRC connection establishment |
| selectedPLMN-Identity | 1 (→ 310/410) | Index into SIB1 PLMN list |
| dedicatedInfoNAS | EMM Attach Request | First NAS PDU tunnelled to the MME |
| EPS attach type | EPS attach (1) | Type of attach being performed |
| EPS mobile identity | GUTI / IMSI 310410123456789 | Subscriber identity toward the MME |
| UE network capability | EEA0/1/2, EIA1/2 | Supported NAS/AS ciphering & integrity |
| ESM message container | PDN Connectivity Request | Requests the default-bearer IP session |
| PDN type | IPv4 | Requested IP version for the default bearer |
LTE Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol
UL-DCCH-Message
message: c1 (0)
c1: rrcConnectionSetupComplete (4)
rrcConnectionSetupComplete-r8
selectedPLMN-Identity: 1 [310/410]
dedicatedInfoNAS: 7441...
Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) PDU
EPS mobility management message
Security header type: Plain NAS message (0)
Message type: Attach request (0x41)
EPS attach type: EPS attach (1)
EPS mobile identity: IMSI 310410123456789
UE network capability: EEA0/1/2 EIA1/2
ESM message container: PDN connectivity request (PDN type IPv4)Which channel / DCI / RNTI carries each RACH-RRC message: Msg1 is the PRACH preamble (no DCI). Msg2 (RAR) is a MAC PDU on PDSCH scheduled by a DCI format 1A / RA-RNTI in the common search space, within ra-ResponseWindowSize. Msg3 (RRCConnectionRequest on CCCH/SRB0) is sent on PUSCH using the RAR uplink grant, scrambled by the Temporary C-RNTI. Msg4 (RRCConnectionSetup) is PDSCH scheduled by DCI 1A / Temporary C-RNTI, and on success the T-C-RNTI is promoted to the UE's C-RNTI. From RRCConnectionSetupComplete onward, DL grants use DCI 1/1A / C-RNTI and UL grants use DCI 0 / C-RNTI, all in the UE-specific search space.
✅ Debugging steps
- Step 5 (Msg1): confirm the UE transmitted a preamble on a PRACH occasion derived from
prach-ConfigIndex, computed theRA-RNTIfrom the time/frequency, and check open-loop power (preambleInitialReceivedTargetPower+ pathloss) and ramping. - Step 6 (Msg2): verify a RAR arrived inside
ra-ResponseWindowSizewith aRAPIDmatching the sent preamble, and that theTiming Advance, UL grant andTemporary C-RNTIwere applied. - Step 7–8 (Msg3/Msg4): check
RRCConnectionRequestwas decoded (CRC/HARQ) and thatRRCConnectionSetupresolved contention and established SRB1; confirm the T-C-RNTI → C-RNTI promotion. - Step 9: confirm
RRCConnectionSetupCompletecarried the NASAttach Request+PDN Connectivity Request, and thatselectedPLMN-Identityindexes the intended PLMN.
⚠ Common causes of failure
- Preamble not detected (weak UL, PRACH interference, config mismatch) or ramping exhausts
preambleTransMax— no RAR. - RAR missed — window too short, wrong
RA-RNTIderivation, or PDCCH CCE congestion so no grant reaches the UE. - Msg3 CRC failure or contention lost at Msg4, so no RRC connection; the UE restarts from Msg1.
- Attach Request rejected downstream (bad IMSI/GUTI, EMM cause) even though RRC set up cleanly — the failure is NAS, not RACH.
Phase C — Attach, Identity & Authentication (Steps 10–12)
The MME now owns the procedure. The eNB relays the Attach Request over S1-MME, the MME resolves the subscriber identity and runs EPS-AKA against the HSS over the Diameter S6a interface, and then activates NAS security. From the end of this phase every NAS message is ciphered and integrity protected.
The eNB extracts the NAS PDU from RRCConnectionSetupComplete and forwards it to a selected MME in an S1AP Initial UE Message over the S1-MME interface. NAS and AS are separate layers: the eNB only sets up the RRC connection, while the Attach Request is meant for the MME, so piggybacking it on the first uplink RRC message gets it there in the earliest possible message. The eNB binds an eNB UE S1AP ID, includes the RRC Establishment Cause, and reports the TAI and E-UTRAN CGI so the MME knows where the UE is. The MME creates a UE context and begins the EMM attach procedure.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Message | S1AP InitialUEMessage | First S1-MME message for this UE |
| eNB-UE-S1AP-ID | 1024 | eNB-side UE identifier on S1-MME |
| NAS-PDU | EMM Attach Request (opaque) | Transparently relayed NAS from the UE |
| TAI | PLMN 310/410, TAC 0x1A2B | Tracking Area for MME selection/registration |
| E-UTRAN CGI | PLMN 310/410 + ECI 0x00A1B20 | Cell where the UE is located |
| RRC Establishment Cause | mo-Signalling | Propagated from RRCConnectionRequest |
| S-TMSI | 0x010C1A55E3 | Aids MME to locate an existing UE context |
Stream Control Transmission Protocol
Source port: 36412 Destination port: 36412
Payload protocol identifier: S1AP (18)
S1 Application Protocol
initiatingMessage
procedureCode: id-initialUEMessage (12)
eNB-UE-S1AP-ID: 1024
NAS-PDU: 7441... [Attach request]
TAI: PLMN 310/410, tAC 0x1a2b
EUTRAN-CGI: PLMN 310/410, cell-ID 0x00a1b20
RRC-Establishment-Cause: mo-Signalling (0)
S-TMSI: mMEC 0x01, m-TMSI 0x0c1a55e3If the MME cannot resolve the UE from a GUTI it first runs Identity Request/Response to obtain the IMSI, then performs EPS-AKA. It asks the HSS for an authentication vector with the Diameter S6a Authentication-Information-Request; the HSS runs Milenage and returns an EPS Authentication Vector in the Authentication-Information-Answer — RAND, AUTN, XRES and the key K_ASME derived for this serving network. The MME then challenges the UE with the NAS Authentication Request (RAND, AUTN, KSI_ASME). The USIM verifies AUTN (network authenticity and sequence number), computes RES, and the UE returns it in the Authentication Response. The MME compares RES to XRES; a match means mutual authentication has succeeded and K_ASME is anchored on both sides.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| S6a AIR | IMSI 310410123456789 + Visited-PLMN | MME requests AVs for the subscriber |
| Number-Of-Requested-Vectors | 1 | How many EPS AVs the MME wants |
| RAND | 0x8f3a...c21d (128-bit) | Random challenge in the vector |
| AUTN | 0x1b77...a904 (128-bit) | Authentication token (SQN⊕AK, AMF, MAC) |
| XRES / RES | 0x5d2e9a11 | Expected vs UE response for mutual auth |
| K_ASME | 256-bit (derived by HSS) | Master key from which NAS/AS keys derive |
| KSI_ASME (eKSI) | 0 | Key set identifier for the security context |
Diameter Protocol
Version: 0x01
Command Code: 318 (Authentication-Information)
Flags: 0xc0 (Request, Proxyable)
ApplicationId: 3GPP S6a/S6d (16777251)
AVP: User-Name (1) = 310410123456789
AVP: Visited-PLMN-Id (1407) = 310/410
AVP: Requested-EUTRAN-Authentication-Info
Number-Of-Requested-Vectors (1410): 1
Immediate-Response-Preferred (1412): 1
AVP: Auth-Session-State (277) = NO_STATE_MAINTAINED (1)S1 Application Protocol
initiatingMessage
procedureCode: id-downlinkNASTransport (11)
MME-UE-S1AP-ID: 40551
eNB-UE-S1AP-ID: 1024
NAS-PDU: 0752...
Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) PDU
EPS mobility management message
Security header type: Plain NAS message (0)
Message type: Authentication request (0x52)
NAS key set identifier (eKSI): 0
Authentication parameter RAND: 8f3a...c21d
Authentication parameter AUTN: 1b77...a904The MME selects a ciphering algorithm (EEA) and an integrity algorithm (EIA) and sends an integrity-protected NAS Security Mode Command, replaying the UE's security capabilities so the UE can detect a bidding-down attack. The UE derives K_NASenc and K_NASint from K_ASME, verifies the MAC, and answers with a ciphered and integrity-protected Security Mode Complete which may carry the IMEISV. From here every NAS message is protected.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Message (DL) | Security Mode Command (EMM) | Activates the NAS security context |
| Selected NAS algorithms | EEA2 (128-AES) / EIA2 | Chosen ciphering & integrity algorithms |
| NAS key set identifier (eKSI) | 0 | Identifies the context being activated |
| Replayed UE security capabilities | EEA0/1/2, EIA1/2 | Echoed to detect bidding-down attacks |
| Security header type | Integrity protected with new context | SMC is integrity-only; SMComplete ciphered |
| Message (UL) | Security Mode Complete (EMM) | Confirms security activation |
| IMEISV | 3556980412345612 | Device identity requested by the network |
| NAS-MAC | 0x9c4f21ab | Integrity check on the SMC/SMComplete |
S1 Application Protocol
initiatingMessage
procedureCode: id-downlinkNASTransport (11)
MME-UE-S1AP-ID: 40551
eNB-UE-S1AP-ID: 1024
NAS-PDU: 3721...
Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) PDU
EPS mobility management message
Security header type: Integrity protected with new EPS context (3)
Message type: Security mode command (0x5d)
Selected NAS security algorithms: EEA2 / EIA2
NAS key set identifier (eKSI): 0
Replayed UE security capabilities: EEA0/1/2, EIA1/2
IMEISV request: requested (1)✅ Debugging steps
- Step 10: confirm the eNB relayed the NAS PDU in an S1AP
Initial UE Messagewith the correctTAI/E-UTRAN CGIand bound aneNB-UE-S1AP-ID; a mis-selected MME here stalls the whole attach. - Step 11 (auth): check the MME fetched a vector over S6a (
Authentication-Information-Request/Answer) and that the UE'sRESmatched the HSSXRES; ifAUTNverification failed at the USIM, expect anAuthentication Failurewith a cause (MAC failure / SQN out of range). - Step 12 (security): verify the
Security Mode Commandreplayed the UE's security capabilities, the selectedEEA/EIAare mutually supported, and the UE'sSecurity Mode Completepassed the NAS-MAC integrity check. - Confirm the
eKSIties the authentication vector to the security context being activated.
⚠ Common causes of failure
- S6a failure — HSS unreachable, subscriber unknown (
DIAMETER_ERROR_USER_UNKNOWN), or roaming not allowed — MME cannot get a vector. - Authentication mismatch —
RES≠XRES(wrong key/OP) or USIM rejectsAUTN(SQN desync), producingAuthentication Failure/ re-sync. - Security Mode Command rejected — no common
EEA/EIAalgorithm, or a NAS-MAC failure suggesting a bidding-down/integrity problem. - Identity procedure loops — MME cannot resolve GUTI to IMSI and the UE does not answer the
Identity Request.
Phase D — Session Creation, Bearer Setup & Attach Accept (Steps 13–18)
With the subscriber authenticated and NAS security active, the MME builds the IP session across the S-GW/P-GW, hands the eNB everything it needs to set up the radio bearer and AS security, and delivers the Attach Accept. Once the UE confirms, the downlink path is stitched end-to-end and user data flows on the default EPS bearer.
The MME creates the EPS session on the user plane using GTPv2-C. It sends a Create Session Request to the Serving Gateway over S11, which relays it to the PDN Gateway over S5/S8. The P-GW allocates the UE's IP address (PDN Address), sets up the default EPS bearer with the negotiated QoS (QCI and ARP), and returns the S5/S8 and S1-U TEIDs in the Create Session Response. The core-side data path is now half-built — it still needs the eNB's downlink TEID, which arrives later in Step 17.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Message | Create Session Request (GTPv2-C) | Builds the EPS session in the core |
| IMSI | 310410123456789 | Subscriber the session belongs to |
| APN | internet | Access Point Name selecting the PDN/P-GW |
| EPS Bearer ID (EBI) | 5 | Identifier of the default bearer |
| Default bearer QoS | QCI=9 ARP=8 | Non-GBR best-effort QoS for the default bearer |
| PDN Address (PAA) | 10.44.7.201 | UE IPv4 address allocated by the P-GW |
| S-GW S1-U F-TEID | 0x0A00071E / 10.10.10.1 | S-GW uplink GTP-U endpoint toward the eNB |
| P-GW S5/S8 F-TEID | 0x0B10552A / 10.20.20.1 | P-GW GTP-C/U endpoint on S5 |
| APN-AMBR | DL 150M / UL 50M | Aggregate non-GBR rate for the APN |
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 2123, Dst Port: 2123
GPRS Tunneling Protocol V2
Flags: 0x48 (version 2)
Message Type: Create Session Request (32)
Tunnel Endpoint Identifier: 0x00000000
IMSI: 310410123456789
Access Point Name (APN): internet
Bearer Context [Grouped IE]
EPS Bearer ID (EBI): 5
Bearer Level QoS: QCI 9, ARP 8
F-TEID: S-GW S1-U, TEID 0x0A00071E, IPv4 10.10.10.1
PDN Address Allocation (PAA): IPv4 10.44.7.201
Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate (APN-AMBR): DL 150M, UL 50MThe MME hands everything the eNB needs in one S1AP message. It carries the AS root key K_eNB (derived from K_ASME), the UE Security Capabilities, the UE-AMBR, the E-RAB To Be Setup List for the default bearer (E-RAB ID, QoS, and the S-GW S1-U TEID for uplink data), and — embedded as a NAS PDU — the Attach Accept with the Activate Default EPS Bearer Context Request for the eNB to deliver to the UE. The eNB uses this to compute the AS keys and to build the RRC reconfiguration.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Message | InitialContextSetupRequest (S1AP) | MME sets up the UE context at the eNB |
| MME-UE-S1AP-ID | 40551 | MME-side UE association identity |
| Security Key (K_eNB) | 0x6a1f...e0b3 (256-bit) | Base key for AS ciphering/integrity |
| UE Security Capabilities | EEA/EIA bitmap | Supported AS algorithms for eNB selection |
| E-RAB To Be Setup Item | E-RAB-ID=5, QCI=9, ARP=8 | Default bearer to map onto a DRB |
| Transport Layer Addr / GTP-TEID | 10.10.10.1 / 0x0A00071E | S-GW S1-U endpoint for uplink data |
| UE-AMBR | DL 150M / UL 50M | Aggregate maximum bit rate for the UE |
| NAS-PDU (embedded) | Attach Accept | Piggybacked for delivery to the UE |
Stream Control Transmission Protocol
Payload protocol identifier: S1AP (18)
S1 Application Protocol
initiatingMessage
procedureCode: id-InitialContextSetup (9)
MME-UE-S1AP-ID: 40551
eNB-UE-S1AP-ID: 1024
uEaggregateMaximumBitRate: DL 150M / UL 50M
E-RABToBeSetupListCtxtSUReq: 1 item
E-RAB-ID: 5
E-RABlevelQoSParameters: QCI 9, ARP 8
transportLayerAddress: 10.10.10.1
gTP-TEID: 0x0A00071E
SecurityKey (KeNB): 6a1f...e0b3
UESecurityCapabilities: EEA2 / EIA2
NAS-PDU: 0742... [Attach accept, embedded]The eNB activates access-stratum security and configures the radio bearers. In practice AS security (K_RRCenc, K_RRCint, K_UPenc derived from K_eNB) is turned on first, then the eNB sends RRCConnectionReconfiguration adding SRB2 for NAS transport and the default Data Radio Bearer with its drb-Identity, eps-BearerIdentity, PDCP/RLC and logicalChannelConfig. The same message carries the NAS Attach Accept inside dedicatedInfoNAS so the UE receives it in one shot. The UE applies the configuration and prepares to confirm.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Message | RRCConnectionReconfiguration (DL-DCCH) | Sets up SRB2 + default DRB and delivers NAS |
| srb-ToAddMod / srb-Identity | 2 | Establishes SRB2 for NAS transport |
| drb-ToAddMod / drb-Identity | 1 | Data radio bearer for the default bearer |
| eps-BearerIdentity | 5 | Links the DRB to the EPS default bearer |
| logicalChannelConfig (DRB) | priority=13 | LCH priority for the best-effort DRB |
| pdcp-Config / rlc-Config | 12-bit SN, RLC-AM | User-plane PDCP/RLC for the DRB |
| securityConfigHO / algorithms | EEA2 / EIA2 (AS active) | Turns on AS ciphering/integrity |
| dedicatedInfoNAS | Attach Accept | NAS delivered inside the reconfiguration |
LTE Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol
DL-DCCH-Message
message: c1 (0)
c1: rrcConnectionReconfiguration (3)
rrcConnectionReconfiguration
rrc-TransactionIdentifier: 1
criticalExtensions: c1 (0)
rrcConnectionReconfiguration-r8
radioResourceConfigDedicated
srb-ToAddModList: srb-Identity 2
drb-ToAddModList: 1 item
drb-Identity: 1
eps-BearerIdentity: 5
logicalChannelConfig: priority 13
dedicatedInfoNASList: Attach acceptThe UE applies the new configuration and replies with RRCConnectionReconfigurationComplete on SRB1, confirming SRB2/DRB establishment and active AS security. The eNB then sends the S1AP Initial Context Setup Response to the MME, importantly providing the eNB's downlink S1-U GTP-TEID so the S-GW can later route downlink data. The default-bearer radio leg is now fully set up.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| RRCReconfigurationComplete | rrc-TransactionId=1 | Confirms reconfiguration applied |
| Message (S1AP) | InitialContextSetupResponse | eNB tells MME the context is up |
| E-RAB Setup List Item | E-RAB-ID=5 | Bearer successfully set up at the eNB |
| eNB S1-U F-TEID (DL) | 0x0C0A0201 / 10.30.30.5 | eNB downlink GTP-U endpoint for the bearer |
| Transport Layer Address | 10.30.30.5 | eNB user-plane IP for S1-U |
| MME-UE-S1AP-ID | 40551 | Associates the response with the MME context |
| eNB-UE-S1AP-ID | 1024 | eNB-side association identity |
Stream Control Transmission Protocol
Payload protocol identifier: S1AP (18)
S1 Application Protocol
successfulOutcome
procedureCode: id-InitialContextSetup (9)
MME-UE-S1AP-ID: 40551
eNB-UE-S1AP-ID: 1024
E-RABSetupListCtxtSURes: 1 item
E-RAB-ID: 5
transportLayerAddress: 10.30.30.5
gTP-TEID: 0x0C0A0201The Attach Accept that reached the UE assigned a new GUTI, the TAI list, and the Activate Default EPS Bearer Context Request with the UE IP, APN and negotiated QoS. The UE stores the GUTI/TAI list and answers with the NAS Attach Complete, which carries the Activate Default EPS Bearer Context Accept, sent up as an UL Information Transfer / Uplink NAS Transport to the MME. One loose end remains on the core: the S-GW still does not know the eNB's downlink TEID. The MME closes this with a GTPv2-C Modify Bearer Request to the S-GW carrying the eNB S1-U TEID; the S-GW answers with Modify Bearer Response. The downlink tunnel is now stitched end-to-end.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Message (UL NAS) | Attach Complete (EMM) | UE confirms the attach |
| ESM message container | Activate Default EPS Bearer Ctx Accept | UE confirms default bearer activation |
| EPS Bearer ID | 5 | Bearer being confirmed |
| GUTI (assigned) | 0x310410-0001-C1A55E3 | New globally unique temporary identity stored |
| Message (S11) | Modify Bearer Request (GTPv2-C) | Delivers eNB DL TEID to the S-GW |
| eNB S1-U F-TEID (DL) | 0x0C0A0201 / 10.30.30.5 | Downlink endpoint the S-GW must route to |
| Modify Bearer Response cause | Request accepted (16) | DL path stitched; data can flow |
S1 Application Protocol
initiatingMessage
procedureCode: id-uplinkNASTransport (13)
MME-UE-S1AP-ID: 40551
eNB-UE-S1AP-ID: 1024
NAS-PDU: 0743...
Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) PDU
EPS mobility management message
Security header type: Integrity protected and ciphered (2)
Message type: Attach complete (0x43)
ESM message container
Activate default EPS bearer context accept (EBI 5)User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 2123, Dst Port: 2123
GPRS Tunneling Protocol V2
Flags: 0x48 (version 2)
Message Type: Modify Bearer Request (34)
Tunnel Endpoint Identifier: 0x0A00071E
Bearer Context [Grouped IE]
EPS Bearer ID (EBI): 5
F-TEID: eNB S1-U, TEID 0x0C0A0201, IPv4 10.30.30.5
[Response] Modify Bearer Response: cause Request accepted (16)With the downlink tunnel stitched, uplink and downlink IP packets flow on the default EPS bearer. On the air interface they ride the DRB (mapped to logical channel, RLC-AM, PDCP with 12-bit SN); on S1-U they are encapsulated in GTP-U G-PDUs between the eNB and the S-GW, and on S5/S8 between the S-GW and the P-GW toward the internet. The example below shows an uplink G-PDU carrying the UE's first packet from IP 10.44.7.201 out through the S-GW S1-U TEID. The attach is complete and the UE is EMM-REGISTERED.
| IE / Field | Example Value | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| GTP-U message type | G-PDU (0xFF) | Carries a user-plane IP packet |
| TEID (UL, to S-GW) | 0x0A00071E | S-GW S1-U endpoint for uplink data |
| Inner source IP | 10.44.7.201 | UE IP allocated by the P-GW |
| EPS Bearer / DRB | EBI 5 / DRB 1 | Default bearer carrying the traffic |
| QCI | 9 (non-GBR) | Best-effort scheduling treatment |
| PDCP SN | 0 (first PDU) | Sequence number on the DRB |
| UDP/GTP-U port | 2152 | Standard GTP-U user-plane port |
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 2152, Dst Port: 2152
GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP-U)
Flags: 0x30 (version 1, PT=1)
Message Type: G-PDU (0xff)
Length: 96
Tunnel Endpoint Identifier: 0x0A00071E
Internet Protocol Version 4
Source Address: 10.44.7.201
Destination Address: 93.184.216.34
Protocol: TCP (6)
TCP: 49876 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240✅ Debugging steps
- Step 13: confirm the MME sent
Create Session Requestwith the rightAPN, that the P-GW allocated aPDN Address, and that the default-bearer QoS (QCI=9/ARP=8) andAPN-AMBRcame back in the response with valid S-GW/P-GWF-TEIDs. - Step 14–15: verify
Initial Context Setup RequestcarriedK_eNB, the E-RAB (EBI 5) and UE-AMBR, and thatRRCConnectionReconfigurationset up SRB2 + the default DRB, turned on AS security, and embedded theAttach Accept. - Step 16: check
RRCConnectionReconfigurationCompleteand that the eNB returned its downlink S1-UGTP-TEIDinInitial Context Setup Response. - Step 17–18: confirm
Attach CompletecarriedActivate Default EPS Bearer Context Accept, theModify Bearer Request/Responsestitched the DL path, and a first G-PDU actually flows on the DRB.
⚠ Common causes of failure
Create Sessionfails — APN not resolvable, P-GW rejects, or no IP address available for the requested PDN type.- eNB admission/radio failure — the default DRB cannot be set up, or the
RRCConnectionReconfigurationis lost, soAttach Acceptnever reaches the UE. - Downlink path not stitched — the eNB DL
TEIDnever reaches the S-GW viaModify Bearer, so uplink works but downlink data is black-holed. - NAS security/context mismatch — the embedded
Attach Acceptfails integrity, so the UE never sendsAttach Complete.
LTE ↔ NR (5G SA): the same skeleton reappears with new names. Attach becomes the 5G Registration procedure; the MME splits into AMF (mobility) + SMF (session); the S-GW/P-GW become the UPF (user plane) with the SMF controlling it over N4; S6a toward the HSS becomes the AMF talking to the UDM/AUSF, and EPS-AKA becomes 5G-AKA. The default EPS bearer becomes a PDU Session established by a separate PDU Session Establishment Request (not always bundled into registration), the APN becomes a DNN, and per-bearer QoS becomes per-flow QoS Flows (QFI) with SDAP mapping them to DRBs. Cell search also changes: NR reads the MIB on PBCH within an SSB and the rest of system information from SIB1 via ServingCellConfigCommon rather than LTE's SIB1/SIB2 split.
Summary
The fastest way to root-cause an attach failure is to find the first phase that broke. A → B → C → D: if the UE never camps, it is cell search (band/EARFCN, PSS/SSS, MIB, SIB, PLMN/S-criteria). If it camps but never connects, it is random access and RRC (preamble, RAR window, Msg3 CRC, contention resolution). If RRC comes up but the UE is rejected, it is authentication and security (S6a vectors, RES vs XRES, AUTN, EEA/EIA). If everything authenticates but there is no data, it is session and bearer setup (Create Session, APN/IP, default DRB, and the Modify Bearer that stitches the downlink).
Used log-in-hand, each numbered step gives you an exact message on a named interface with the IEs to verify. The first field that does not line up — a wrong RA-RNTI, a RES mismatch, a missing eNB DL TEID — is almost always the root cause, and it tells you which node (UE, eNB, MME, HSS, or S-GW/P-GW) to look at next.
Q. Why is the ESM PDN Connectivity Request piggybacked on the Attach Request?
A. EPS is always-on: the network creates a default EPS bearer as part of attach. Bundling the PDN Connectivity Request lets the MME start building the IP session immediately and saves a round trip, so the UE comes out of attach with an IP address and a working default bearer.
Q. On a first-ever attach, is the Attach Request secured?
A. No. There is no security context yet, so the initial Attach Request (in RRCConnectionSetupComplete) is neither ciphered nor integrity-protected. Security starts at the NAS Security Mode Command/Complete, after EPS-AKA; from then on NAS messages are protected, and AS security is activated before the RRCConnectionReconfiguration that carries Attach Accept.
Q. Why does the MME send a Modify Bearer Request at the very end?
A. When Create Session runs, the S-GW does not yet know the eNB's downlink S1-U TEID — the eNB only reports it in Initial Context Setup Response. Modify Bearer delivers that TEID to the S-GW so the downlink GTP-U tunnel is complete; without it, downlink data is black-holed.
Q. What confirms mutual authentication succeeded?
A. The USIM verifies AUTN (authenticating the network and checking the sequence number) and computes RES; the MME compares RES to the HSS-supplied XRES. A match means both sides authenticated and K_ASME is anchored, from which the NAS and AS keys are derived.
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